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ABSTRACT 
This work tries to understand how an exposure to economic logic and the current definition of 
rationality influences behavior. I use a randomized scrambled-sentence test that primes different 
groups either with economic or moral oriented key-words; then follows a set of ethical games, mainly  
variations of  the Prisoner’s dilemma.  In both an experimental setting (117 economics/business 
graduates) and online survey (113 subjects), I do not find evidence that this short-term, conceptual 
priming has an impact on agents’ decisions regarding this sort of dilemmas. This might be due to the 
ineffectiveness of the priming, or due to its subtle nature that only bigger datasets can uncover. 
However, it is found evidence in the online survey corroborating the literature stance that having had 
an economics background alters behavior towards defection. The evidence also highlights a 
particularly robust find in the literature: cooperation rates are far higher than expected by the self-
interest model. These findings then open a more in depth discussion about the very concept of 
rationality and the epistemological path within economics.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The present work aims at giving another insight into those workings of the mind, that 
we now recognize as essential to further our understanding of economics. Hopefully, the brief 
empirical evidence presented below and the corresponding theoretical framing will allow a 
small but consistent step in that direction. As a complement, this works aims also at reviving 
the discussion between ethics and economics (which, from its Ancient Greek birth, used to be 
a branch of the former) and if, as it seems to be happening with psychology, they should be 
brought together once more (Amemiya, 2007; Sen, 1987). 
I run one experiment in a computer lab environment and collect additional information 
through an online questionnaire. Both using priming techniques (scrambled sentence) into 
randomized groups within the studied group. The subjects then play a series of prisoner’s 
dilemma hypothetical games.  Although no significant evidence is found to support the 
hypothesis that the priming is working, the evidence does not allow one  to unequivocally 
discard it.  
I will start by giving an overview of the scientific literature on broad aspects of 
economics (namely its history of thought) and then narrow it down to experiments directly 
related to the one conducted here. I will then describe the methodology used, briefly depict the 
data and present the results. Finally, I will discuss the results, their meaning and possible 
directions of further research.  
 
Modern economics has its history first tailored by an attempt to step away from any 
“metaphysical traces”; an attempt to shed light into the mental models that drive agents’ actions 
but refrain from delving into the field of psychology and philosophy in a way that would strip 
an approach from any impartiality (Hurtado & Mick, 2011). That same impartiality, 
independent of the need of introspection, that would allow a mathematical modelling of 
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economies and their principles. And despite the marveling advances and quantitative beauty 
those instruments allowed, intertwined with a rational choice theory approach, previous decades’ 
insights into behavior have shown those do not suffice in understanding reality with precision 
(Cardoso, 2014; Hurtado & Mick, 2011). As such, the reunion of economics with psychology 
into the field of behavioral economics has delivered those innovations this science urged for. Yet, 
despite the effortful job of brilliant economists and psychologists (Tversky, Thaler and 
Kahneman, to name just a few), a sound theoretical construct that does not rely on ad hoc 
addendums to utility functions is still over the horizon. This is not to say the science has been 
still, but that too many “short-theories” have yet to be reconciled over a larger umbrella.  
It is not a novelty that observed human behavior often mismatches from theoretical 
foresight. Many of those deviations and biases might become very predictable (Ariely, 2008), 
others might still offer some resistance for clear explanations (Damásio, 2010; Kahneman & 
Thaler, 1986). The Prisoner’s dilemma setting usually offers a very clear insight into that 
disparity, since it has a sound theoretical formulation on logical operations within game theory, 
yet, when confronted with empirical evidence of human decision, it often fails to predict the 
rational response (Marwell & Ames, 1981; Frank & Regan, 1993).  In fact, the strategy 
predicted by the self-interest model is seldom followed empirically; joint cooperation is much 
more common (Kahneman & Thaler, 1986). Although, in all fairness, the model follows a self-
interest assumption not only due to historical reasons but due to its simplifying nature.  
Marwell & Ames (1981) and Frank et al. (1993) built experimental settings using 
variants of prisoner’s dilemma, including public goods game, and other ethical dilemmas to 
assert if  behavior fits the theoretical prediction and to see if previous knowledge of economic 
theory changes behavior. Under public good’s game circumstances, the socially optimal 
behavior is for all subjects to use their entire endowment in the public good. But from an 
individual perspective, the optimizing strategy is to use none and expect instead others to 
 4 
contribute to the public good. Marwell & Ames (1981) found that economics students 
contributed an average of only 20 percent of their endowments to the public account, 
significantly less than the 49 percent average for all other subjects. It is relevant to note that 
both values are still quite far from the theoretically predicted zero. Frank et al. (1993) found 
similar results in a typical prisoner’s dilemma where subjects were playing for money. Here, 
defection rate for economics majors was 60.4 percent, as compared to only 38.8 percent for 
nonmajors, which again is far from 100 percent in both cases despite the anonymity ensured in 
responses. The authors run a series of other games (e.g. ultimatum game) which delivered 
compliant outcomes.  
Frank et al. (1993) then goes a long way to empirically show that it is not just that students 
which go for economics are more probable to be selfishly rational, but it is likely that it is how 
and what is being taught that influences behavior. 
These results unequivocally point to an important discussion: why do people who appear to 
understand the game conditions choose to behave in an apparent irrational fashion, and why 
economics students behave differently? There are some slightly alternative views to answer 
such conundrum (Thaler, 2015; Güth & Van Damme, 1998; Kahneman & Thaler, 1986; 
Akerlof, 1983) but they seem to agree on the fundamentals of that decision: notions of fairness, 
regardless if those come from true altruistic motives or just long-term strategic behavior.  
It seems, thus, unavoidable that economics is crossing not only the path of psychology, but of 
ethics once more. Especially when considering that the efforts of our discipline in abstaining 
from normative stances have led its students to a particular biased decision. However, could it 
be that biasing people towards a systematic answer coherent with a body of axioms is not just 
educating?  
The present thesis aims to narrow down  why and what exactly influences these decisions either 
towards a classic Homo Economicus stance or, conversely, towards a Homo Moralis one (i.e. 
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a portrayal of a human exclusively guided by morals). A decision that might fall, to great 
extents, over the realm of unconsciousness (Dijksterhuis, 2006; Van Dijk & Wilke, 2002). 
Liberman et al. (2004), for example, use a prisoner’s dilemma setting once more to show simple 
name-framing the game beforehand, either as “Wall Street Game” or as “Community Game”, 
has a considerable effect on cooperation rates, increasing that rate when changing the name 
from the former to the latter on around 40%. 
The literature has already made curious discoveries about the interaction of social and 
economic motives. Perhaps the most insightful, is the case where a daycare implemented 
penalties for parents taking too long in picking up their children which resulted in longer delays 
afterwards (Ariely, 2008). And when the daycare decided to go back and remove the penalties, 
parents did not go back to their pre-penalty behavior right away. The author reasons that what 
leads parents to such behavior is a mental shift from a social rule - leaving their kids to be 
picked up last and after dark is naturally bad - to an economic one - paying money is an 
inconvenience but it might be worthwhile to work an extra hour. This hints that are two separate 
streams of decision, and toying with different types of rules might have unexpected 
consequences.  
Actually, these social-economic frictions are an argument that stretches at least to Polanyi 
(2013, [1944]), where from an historical and anthropological perspective, the author points out 
to the forces within market-structured economies that prevent full social embeddedness - i.e. 
that prevent the existence of a “unique stream” of social rules. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
I conducted two sets of experiments to extract the information that allowed the results 
below. One in a lab environment setting, other through an online questionnaire.  
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The lab experiment (Questionnaire 1. Laboratory setting in Appendix) had 118 subjects - all 
business and economics students from NOVA either from bachelors or masters, of which only 
8 were coming from a different field of study. There was no monetary incentive involved in 
this experiment due to budgetary limitations, but students participating gained instead partial 
ECTs for a course they were attending. Students entered the computer lab where the experiment 
took place at no more than 7 at a time and, at the beginning of each experiment, it was made 
clear to them no one could leave the room before at least 20 minutes had passed, to avoid 
subjects from rushing. The subjects were then delivered the set of questions, including 
demographics, some individual characteristics (political orientation, reported GPA, religious 
beliefs, gender, age, income level, education level, occupation, nationality, highest education 
level of parents, and main field of studies)  the priming and the games themselves. 
The focus of the experiment is to take advantage of the unconscious to glimpse into the 
inner workings of the mind. This is done with a priming technic that tries to influence subjects’ 
responses. Priming offers an opportunity to avoid endogeneity of peoples’ predictions of what 
the experiment is intending (Molden, 2014) and it allows for insightful conclusions for real-
world scenarios since the essence of priming “represents a ubiquitous occurrence in everyday 
life.” (Tulving & Schacter, 1990). For the case where subjects are insightful enough to 
understand what the experiment is trying to do, an additional question was added to the end of 
all games to check if they had guessed the purpose of the experiment (out of all 118 
participants, only one seemed to spot the purpose of the experiment and was, therefore, dropped 
from the analysis). Priming has been used for quite a while in the fields of psychology, more 
frequently now on fields of game theory and behavioral economics, and comes in several forms 
(e.g. verbal, non-verbal, conceptual, perceptual). In this experiment is used a conceptual 
priming, i.e. through the semantic linkage among different words. Specifically, before subjects 
play the main games (Prisoner’s dilemma, Trust game and a Probabilities game) they had to 
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reorder between five and six scrambled sentences that included those cue words intended in 
leading the prime. The subjects were randomized between three priming groups: the neutral 
group, herein Homo Inscius,  that had to reorder sentences with no conceptual pattern; the 
moral group, herein Homo Moralis, that reordered sentences with key words related to morality 
(Morality, Ethics, Goodwill, Right/Wrong, Social) and one extra sentenced that was added 
from the neutral group to decrease the chance of subjects understanding the underlying pattern 
of the primed words; and the rational group, henceforth Homo Economicus,  which sentences 
had key words related to rationality (strategy, analytical, games, utility/objectives, rationality) 
and one extra sentence from the neutral group for the same reasons. The neutral group was 
placed to ensure the priming strategy was not the sole responsible for the effects.  
The randomization is not fully blocked due to software and logistic constraints of the 
experiment implementation but it is randomized in blocks over some feasible characteristics 
(political orientation and field of studies) – stratified randomization – which aims at increasing 
the efficiency of the randomization procedure without affecting the bias (Imai et al., 2008). A 
visual example is left below – fig 1 – where different shapes represent different observable 
characteristics.  
 
Fig 1. Illustration of block randomization vs standard randomization. 
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The scramble sentence usage is far from new either within priming or to infer 
subliminal information out of subjects. Is used here due to its easy implementation and stealthy 
nature in priming (Postmes et al., 2001; Costin, 1969). In addition to deviate attention of 
participants from the specific words while doing the reordering, the scrambled sentences 
ensures the placing of an ideomotor effect (i.e. unconscious mental motions due to the provided 
clues) regardless of being correctly ordered or not, thus seeding the idea under the 
consciousness of subjects which has a non-negligible influence. As a matter of fact, in some 
cases, priming has been powerful enough to change walking speed (Bargh et al., 1996). 
After the priming game, participants were shown an image of a word with four letters 
in which one was not filled out: “G O _ D”. And were then asked to fill out the corresponding 
word. There were here essentially two hypotheses, either “GOOD” or “GOLD”. This aimed to 
be a check if the priming was working, where we would expect the Homo Economicus to be 
more likely to answer “GOLD” than the Homo Moralis group, despite the fact that the word 
“GOOD” is with all likelihood more intuitive. The games followed. 
The games played are of hypothetical nature, hence the conclusions extracted from this 
setting might differ from actual recorded behavior in other experimental setting and/or real life 
situations, but its conclusions are not rendered futile whatever that discrepancy might be (i.e. 
it is essentially a problem of external validity onto actual behavior which is, in the worst case, 
just slightly linked to response recorded). For these 118 students the games presented were: (1) 
a version of a prisoner’s dilemma with a more convoluted narrative, to prevent an immediate 
association with Game Theory and its traditions; (2) a game under similar settings of the 
previous but that translated into a trust game; (3) a probabilities game where participants had 
to decide between two scenarios that had a corresponding payoff and probability of success; 
and a (4) final game only delivered to the last 29 of participants which was a classic case of 
prisoner’s dilemma.  
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(1) The first game – Tale of two cities – is a non-standard version of the prisoner’s 
dilemma. In this setting there is a disease outbreak in a vast region and the Amaurotum town 
has 1000 people sick with this illness and only 1500 units of alfa medicine in stock. To produce 
a cure for this illness it is needed 0.5 units of alfa and omega medicine combined. There is only 
one neighbor town, Ademos, with 1200 people sick and only 1500 units of omega medicine in 
stock. It is very difficult to travel between towns and they only exchange some goods every 3 
years. That time is coming and each town will send a truck to the other. The participant, being 
in Amaurotum, has to decide how many units of medicine will be sent to Ademos.  
(2) The second game – Trust Game – happens in a similar setting of the first game but 
now Ademos has the ability to produce one unit of the cure with only 0.25 of each medicine. 
The participant, being in Amaurotum, has to decide how many units will be sent to Ademos so 
that town can produce and later send a batch of the cure back. This game is slightly different 
in nature from the prisoner’s dilemma because the trusted party plays afterwards. A general 
payoff matrix for this case is left below (Table 1), where cooperation/trusting is sending at least 
550 units of medicine to the neighbor town and the Ademos delivering 1200 units of medicine.  
  
Player  







Cooperate (+;+) (--;++) 
Defect (-;-) (-;-) 
 
(3) In the third game – Probabilities Game – the participant has to decide whether to try 
to save an individual stuck in a well or not. There are payoffs associated with a series of 
conditions and respective probabilities which are purposefully hard to solve in the short time 
available. If the participant was able to finish all the math they would, however, get roughly 
equal payoffs for both decisions.  
Table 1. Payoff Matrix of a typical Trust Game 
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(4) Lastly, the fourth game -  Classic Prisoner’s dilemma – was only presented to a 
subsection of those 118 students (29 to be precise). They had to choose between cooperation 
and defection in a situation where they had committed a crime and got caught with another 
person. Police offers a deal to tell on the other and go free or remain quiet and get imprisoned 
for a short period of time. If the other person decides to tell and they remain silence they have 
to serve a longer sentence. The same if both tell on one another. 
Between game (2) and (3) a second round of priming was delivered which consisted of a brief 
text speaking in favor of rationality, morality or a neutral news report for each corresponding 
group. The complete questions are left at the appendix (Lab Experiment Survey), to avoid 
turning this into a morose reading. At the end of questions (1) and (2) it is also asked how many 
medicine units their colleagues answering this question gave to the neighbor town. Below 
(Table 2) is the generic payoff matrix of the respective games and a synthesis of the information 
of the probabilities game. 
The non-lab. questionnaire (Questionnaire 2. Online setting in Appendix)  was 
distributed online through social-media and contact sharing, which is not ideal since it entails 
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an unavoidable selection bias (only captures people willing to help and closer to the specific 
social circles from which departs). This represents again only an issue of external validity to 
further extrapolate conclusions to the overall population but that is a problem only scientific 
replication can solve. However, priming effects are usually indistinguishable from different 
individuals regardless of age or explicit memory performance and, thus, one should expect 
group differences to remain constant (Tulving & Schacter, 1990).  
The structure of this questionnaire comes close to the one in the lab experiment. 
However, in this case, there were only two priming groups: Homo Economicus and Homo 
Moralis. This was made so due unclear results regarding the neutral group from the lab 
experiment and to the increased statistical power that having only two groups allows. In order 
to retain a maximum number of people in those web-distributed surveys, the demographics 
information is collected after the priming and games are played (which unfortunately impeded 
the randomization to be fully or partially blocked). The games played were the (4) Classic 
Prisoner’s dilemma described above and (5) a, yet again, different version of this game with 
the following setting: The participant is set to be on a tour through the jungle and happens to 
be in a perfect spot to take an amazing picture of a rare exotic bird. There is a stranger who has 
the same opportunity and the participant has to decide to take the picture or not. After the 
picture is taken the bird will fly away. If both decide to take the picture, the bird will get startled 
and will fly away with no opportunity to get the shot for neither. If none decides to take the 
picture the bird will eventually fly away but both can at least enjoy that brief moment.  The 
payoff matrix associated with this game is equivalent to the one in (4) so I will abstain from 
reproducing it once more. 
Between game (1) and (2) a second round of priming was also delivered which consisted of a 
brief quote speaking in favor of rationality or morality, consistent with the first priming (quotes 
used for priming exhibited below – Table 3).  
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Priming Quote for Homo Economicus group Priming Quote for Homo Moralis group 
 
"A rational man is guided by its thinking - a 
process of Reason - not by his feelings or 
desires."    
                                             Ayn Rand   
"Emotions make us human. Denying them 
make us beasts."     
                                                   Victoria Klein 
 
   Table 3. Quotes used in second round priming of the online survey.  
 
This survey collected a total of 113 full responses and 33 as partial data collected from 
unfinished surveys.  
In both questionnaires (lab. and online version) time taken to answer each question and number 
of mouse clicks were counted. Participants were not aware of such since that might had 
changed the way they answered.  
After the experiments, the three/two randomized groups were compared to look for 
significant differences as custom in randomized experiments. Additionally, I looked for relevant 
patterns between subjects’ choices and their personal information (e.g. income, education) but 
preliminary observations did not find consistent patterns and, in any case, a thorough analysis goes 
outside the scope of this work.  Reported significance tests were made using two-sided Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) for the lab setting and two-sided Fisher tests for the online-survey.  
 
DATA 
The three differently primed groups (Economicus, Moralis and Inscius of 38, 40, and 
39 subjects respectively) from the lab experiment are well balanced across the different 
variables except for the gender one where the Homo Economicus group has 74% females where 
Homo Moralis and Inscius have 50% and 58% respectively. This might diminish the perceived 
impact of the Homo Economicus priming since females are thought to be more prone to 
cooperate in these sorts of prisoner’s dilemma games (Frank et al., 1993). Since only NOVA 
Bachelors and Master’s students were a part of this experiment, the sample age is around 21 
years old and has little variation (variance around 4,31).  
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Female 60% Portugal 67% 
Male 40% Germany 15% 
    Italy 8% 
    Other 9% 
Political identity       
Right 30% Religious beliefs   
Center 53% Yes 55% 
Left 17% No 45% 
        
Academic Background   Parents Education level   
Business/Economics 93% Below High-School 4% 
Other 7% High-School 11% 
    Bachelor's Degree 38% 
Attended a Game Theory 
Course   Master's Degree 38% 
Yes 52% Doctorate Degree 9% 
No 48%     
Table 4. Lab experiment sample summary. 
For the online survey case there are only two groups (Economicus and Moralis of 61 
and 52 subjects respectively), well balanced across variables. This sample has an average age 
of approximately 28 years old and a much bigger variance (123,7)  than the previous lab setting 
data and comprises non-student subjects (slightly more than 50%).  
The different setting in which the subjects submit the answers to the games played (i.e. a 
controlled environment in lab context conversely to the online survey) is likely to influence 
those answers and inference should take that into account. Besides the structural difference 
between the two experiments, there are also noticeable differences in the sample. More 
poignantly, there is a 22% rise in atheism when we move from the lab sample to the online 
one, and a much more academic diverse group although half are still coming from 
business/economics. The parent’s education level is also slightly higher for the sample of 
NOVA students. These differences highlight the importance of treating the results derived from 
each experimental setting separately and assessing which might be more suitable for certain 
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hypothesis testing (e.g. the experimental setting is not appropriate to test if students of 
economics are less cooperative since it has almost non-variation in that regard). 
Table 5. Online Survey sample summary. 
As already referred, one subject was dropped from the analysis in the lab experiment (hence 
the 117 and not 118 subjects). No more subjects were dropped since a thorough evaluation of 
the answers on the sentence scrambling game and of the time records allowed to conclude that 
subjects committed to the questionnaire in an adequate manner to consider their answers 
trustworthy (this applies to both the lab and online survey settings). In the online survey only 
fully filled questionnaires were taken into account for the final analysis but the 33 partial data 
responses revealed a curious detail over its distribution. Of those 33 that failed to complete the 






Female 50% Portugal 77% 
Male 50% Canada 12% 
    Thailand 4% 
    Other 7% 
Political identity       
Right 15% Religious beliefs   
Center 52% Yes 33% 
Left 33% No 67% 
        
Academic Background   Parents Education level  
Business/Economics 41% Below High-School 11% 
Other 59% High-School 30% 
    Bachelor's Degree 35% 
Attended a Game Theory 
Course   Master's Degree 17% 
Yes 35% Doctorate Degree 8% 
No 65%     
        
Occupancy  Education Level  
Employed 42% High-School 19% 
Unemployed 5% Bachelor's Degree 53% 
Student 49% Master's Degree 27% 
Retired 4% Doctorate Degree 1% 
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likely to be by change (significant using a 10% significance level for a two tailed test) but the 
reasons for such, if not sheer luck, are out of the scope of this work.  
A summary with the main statistics of the online survey data is left above – Table 5.  
 
RESULTS  
Due to aforementioned reasons I will separate the results into two groups: lab setting 
and online survey setting.  
In the lab experiment setting, the differently primed groups show no statistically significant 
difference in responses using both the median and the average, and number of “yes” 
(probabilities game) for the first three games. In the first game (1) the median is exactly equal 
across all groups, 600€, and the average goes, in ascending order, Inscius, Economicus and 
Moralis. But again, small differences that do not hold across games with p-values around 90%. 
I will not go into much more detail around each of these three games since the data essentially 
points to a non-rejection of the hypothesis that different group individuals are drawn from a 
common distribution function.  
The “GO_D” image and subsequent question were devised to check if the priming was working 
or the potential difference in the groups were due to any other reason, and despite the bigger 
percentage of “gold” vs “good” responses from Homo Economicus to Moralis it is not 
statistically significant, hence the priming appears to not have exerted any effect.  
But other points are worth mentioning, namely that cooperation rates are far higher than the 
self-interest model predicts. In fact, only two out of the 117 subjects answered zero and when 
asked how much they thought other subjects gave, only five answered zero. Around 29% of 
subjects decided to give less than 600 units of medicine to the neighbor town, and only 39% 
thought others would give less than 600 units.  In the trust game none answered zero in neither 
of the questions and the median is slightly below the quantity needed to produce enough 
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medicine to cure everyone (550 units alfa medicine units) but is quite close – 500€, 525€ and 
538€ to Inscius, Economicus and Moralis groups respectively.  
Also worth mentioning, albeit quite intuitive, people’s predictions of others responses in these 
two games were usually aligned with their own responses. A simple linear regression of those 
two variables, regressing predictions on their own responses, allowed an R-squared of 0.41 and 
0.61 for the first and second games respectively with coefficients around 0.8 for both cases .  
The Probabilities game (3) aimed at checking if subjects, faced with a somehow complex game 
to solve with a short time constraint, would just randomize away their answers (in which case 
we should expect a fifty-fifty share for “save” and “not save”) or they would choose to answer 
based on moral principles and just decide to save. The evidence goes in support of the latter, 
with a global saving rate close of approximately 85%.  
Nonetheless, game (4) – the classic prisoner’s dilemma – that was only played by a 29 
subsample – revealed significant differences for a 5% significance level that followed the initial 
prediction. Despite the significance level, this sample is far too small to support a robust 
argument in favor of the hypothesis and further studies should attempt to replicate these results 
with bigger data sets. But, once more, cooperation rates are far from the self-interest model 
predictions. Total cooperation rates were close to 68%.  
In an attempt to extract maximum value out of the data collected, I did a surface level 
exploratory analysis that aimed at linking subjects’ personal information with their answers. 
No variable revealed noteworthy in explaining the answering patterns and despite the myriad 
of combinations that would definitely output strong correlations between individual 
characteristics and their survey answers, there is a great likelihood those would be simply 
spurious relations. Hence, more intricate relations within the data  are omitted from this 
analysis for their little scientific value and to avoid attempts in justifying correlations that might 
as well just be the work of randomness (Austin et al., 2006).  
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Only with prisoner’s dilemma (4) religion seemed to make a statistically significant difference. 
Once more, on a sample far too small that allows only a splinter of curiosity for further studies 
to investigate.  
Finally, the time measurement for each question did not reveal any discernible pattern among 
groups or each type of response. 
Table 6 below summarizes the relevant information from this lab experimental setting.  
For the online-survey setting, the two differently primed groups reveal once more no 
statistically significant differences. Despite the fact that, in the previous setting, priming in the 
classical prisoner’s dilemma game (4) appeared to be effective, in this setting with the same game 
but a bigger sample (113) there were no significant differences across groups. Neither in the 
photo dilemma game (5), notwithstanding the fact that the Homo Moralis group had slightly 
higher cooperation rates. Just not high enough to dismiss that sheer luck played the entire role.  
The “GO_D” image display revealed again no differences amongst groups. Either the test for the 
priming is inadequate, or it is adequate and the priming appears to be ineffective.  
The exploratory analysis conducted for this data-set was unfruitful in providing any robust link 
between subjects’ personal information and their responses. However, since this data-set has 
greater heterogeneity in individual educational background, allowed a comparison of cooperation 
rates across business/economics  and others that revealed a statistically significant difference, 
which goes in line with the presented literature (economic students are less cooperative). 
However, this only applies when talking about the classic prisoner’s dilemma case (fisher test p-
value of around 0.0018) and not the photo dilemma (5). An equivalent finding goes when looking 
if the subjects had taken a game theory course before or not: having had a game theory course 
increases the chances of the subject defecting but only on the classic version of the game. In 
addition, this data exhibits a curious finding: only around 55% of respondents are consistent with 
their choices of defection/cooperation across the two games. 
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Table 6. Summary statistics for lab experiment across groups.  
(*;**;*** below 10%, 5% and 1% p-value respectively) 
“GO_D” 







 Good 72% 84% 93% 8% 12% 21% 
 Gold 26% 16% 8% -8% -10% -18% 
 Other 3% 0% 0% 0% -3% -3% 
              
Tale of two cities 
(1)             
 Median 600 600 600 0 0 0 
 Average 672 666 646 -20 -6 -26 
              
Prediction for 
others (1)             
 Median 600 600 600 0 0 0 
 Average 635 703 634 -69 68 -1 
              
Trust (2)             
 Median 500 525 538 13 25 38 
 Average 560 579 571 -8 19 11 
              
Prediction for 
others (2)             
 Median 500 500 550 50 0 50 
 Average 515 545 613 68 29 97 
              
Probabilities 
Game (3)             
 Try to Save 90% 82% 85% 3% -8% -5% 
 Not Try to Save 10% 18% 15%       
              
Classic Prisoner's 
Dilemma (4)             
 Stay silent 75% 40% 90% 50%** -35%** 15%* 
 Betrays 25% 60% 10%       
              
              
              
Religion 
Tale of  two 
cities (1) 
Average 




Others (2)  
Average 
Probabilities 
game (3) - 
saving 
Prisoner's 
dilemma (4) - 
cooperating 
 Believer 654,46 624,62 549,23 553,85 86% 79% 
 Non-believer 669,23 696,15 596,25 563,46 85% 57% 
(Believer - Non-
believer) -14,77 -71,54 -47,02 -9,62 2% 21% 
              
Game Theory 
Course  
 No  672,32 680,36 537,59 545,54 89% 75% 
 Yes 650,66 634,43 600,00 569,67 82% 65% 
 (No-Yes) 22 46 -62 -24 7% 10% 
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The other 45% alternate in defecting for one game and cooperating in the other. And among 
those 45%, they split perfectly into two groups that choose to cooperate in the first, defect in 
the second and vice-versa.  
The cooperation rates are around 69% for both games, consistent with the lab-experiment data.  
Timings recorded for each question exhibit no apparent relation to priming groups or answers 
given and are, therefore, not exhibit here for the sake of succinctness. Relevant data is 
summarized  in the below table, Table 7. 
 
Table 7. Summary statistics for online-survey experiment across groups.  
(*;**;*** below 10%, 5% and 1% p-value respectively) 












% Good 77% 71% -6% 
Cooperation 
% 
Gold 23% 23% 0% Believer 78% 54% 
Other 0% 6% 6% Non-believer 64% 76% 








            
Stay 
silent 
67% 71% 4% Game Theory Course 
    
Betrays 33% 29%   No 77% 65% 




      (No-Yes) 23%** -12% 
Take the 
Photo 
36% 25% -11% 
      
Not take 
the photo 
64% 75%   
Field of studies     
        Business/Economics 52% 78% 
  
      
Mathematics, 
Engineering, 
Technology 77% 68% 
Consistency in Cooperation between Games 
Arts, Architecture, 
History, Social 
Studies 82% 59% 
Cooperates in both Games 47% Psychology 78% 44% 
Defects in both Games 9% Law 100% 100% 
Cooperates in (4), defect in (5) 22% Other 82% 65% 
Defects in (4), cooperates in (5) 22% 
(Business/Economics 
– All others) 
-29%*** 15%* 
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Worth remembering that these data by itself does not causally link having game theory, being an 
economics student, being religious, et cetera, to the cooperation patterns found because there might 
be subliminal reasons within that data (e.g. it might be that it is not religion per se that leads 
individuals to be more honest but the fact that less secular families have stricter educations). To 
disentangle those effects a whole new work has to take place in the future.  
The data found only fuels the following discussion when also supported by the literature.  
 
DISCUSSION  
Before discussing the results, it is important to highlight the methodological subtleties that 
limit the inference of this study. First of all, an innate problem in generalizing a hypothetical 
decision in an unrealistic situation, and a rather restricted sample, are intrinsic to the method. Ideally 
the subjects would at least play a game where their decisions faced real consequences even if with 
small amounts of money or other variable compensation. As it is, we strongly depend on what 
subjects report they would do rather than on what they do when faced with the de facto conditions.  
Ideally a truly random-sourced group would allow inference to be made outside of these 
small social/academic circles from which respondents depart. The present setting has little grounds 
to proclaim external validity albeit the randomization allows for internal one.  
On hindsight, the first two games, Tale of Two cities and Trust Game, would have been 
better devised if the possible answers were in a smaller range or were part of a fixed set of answers. 
That is, instead of having a possible answer that went from 0 to 1500, having, for example, 5 
possible values from which the subjects choose. This would decrease the variance of responses and 
allow for greater statistical power. This is particularly relevant when the available sample is small. 
In that same line, it is also important to try to formulate the questions in the simplest manner 
possible to avoid Arithmetic playing a far too relevant role in experiments.  
A curious detail that I only noticed after running the experiments was that the “GO_D” image could 
have somehow primed God concepts and hence increase the likelihood of cooperation, which is a 
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documented finding in the literature (Postmes et al., 2007; Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007). A 
hypothesis that here I deem frankly unlikely given the slightness of the prime itself and the recorded 
cooperation rates that are not far from the remaining literature on prisoner’s dilemma.  
 The results fail to support the hypothesis that the priming is working. This might be due to 
two reasons: either priming is powerless to affect subjects’ decisions, or the effect exerted is slight 
and only bigger data-sets will be able to reveal its true effect. I argue that different effects are 
playing a role in this setting.  
First of all, answers on both experiments are straight to identify that subjects do not play similar 
games in similar manners. Albeit the payoff matrix of prisoner’s dilemma games being identical, 
subjects seem to use different strategies for each game. Which means that instead of following the 
structure of the problem to deduct an optimal answer, subjects rely heavily on its context. Meaning 
at least a good share of subjects follow a deductive reasoning not on grounds of abstract logic but 
on its context/content. Finding what splits respondents over those two groups should allow further 
studies to be devised with more caution. This is a long and dense discussion in Psychology and 
Logic fields but, however interesting, goes outside the scope of this work.  
Secondly, priming is thought to work on the unconscious parts of memory and the mechanics of 
that memory are different from those that operate within consciousness (Molden, 2014). Thus, 
experiments that use priming and then observe subjects’ unconscious behavior record significant 
effects. Bargh et al. (1996) is a common reference in the literature in this regard, since the primed 
subjects altered their walking speed and underlying attitude when exposed to priming related to old 
people and more aggressive key-words, respectively. This might be the reason why priming is not 
working in this setting, because decisions on this experiment fall on the conscience realm while the 
priming makes its effects on the unconscious one. Perhaps other types of priming that rely on 
perceptual cues rather than conceptual ones would prove more effective, or simply stronger 
priming strategies such as differently naming the games (Liberman et al., 2004). Further studies 
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should try to grasp the workings of priming and the impact of those subtleties in the different 
implementations. There is an intrinsic difficulty,  within this type of experimental setting, in dealing 
with slight unconscious cues and to separate causal effects into their respective true treatments. But 
the advent of neuroeconomics should bring great advantages in discerning those subtler patterns 
and modeling what today is regarded as an unpredictable error term. 
 The two experiments find, consistent with the literature, that cooperation rates diverge great 
lengths from self-interest model predictions. And the online-survey points once more into the 
direction that those subjected to a Business/Economics education and those with prior Game 
Theory knowledge are more prone to defecting behavior. Yet, this only applied to the classic 
prisoner’s dilemma (4) game and not the Photo dilemma (5), which is illustrative that those 
teachings are not necessarily (and perhaps fortunately) shifting the mental models of their students 
but only biasing them towards certain answers in a specific context. With all likelihood, students 
from economics have heard of the prisoner’s dilemma and may well be embedded with what is the 
“right answer”, i.e. the Nash-Equilibrium. Economic majors will argue it is the only rational choice 
to be made, and as common people deviate from that answer, we might be tempted to dismiss their 
choice as pure ignorance (Kahneman et al., 1986). It is here economics commits a capital sin.  
From its foundations, modern economics’ object of study was a conceptually severed 
human being: one that «(…)  [did] not pretend to explain every action but only those associated 
with “acquiring and consuming wealth”» (Hurtado & Mick, 2011; Mill 2002: [1843]). That 
conceptual severance was the blossom of the Homo Economicus. Now that economics does not 
shy away from a theory of human action, it is unavoidable to confront the philosophical 
fundamentals behind that stance. A conception of human behavior is needed such that theories’ 
predictions are not mere fables disconnected from reality, but instead are capable of producing a 
being closer to a Homo Integrum. And for that to happen, a rethinking of the very notion of 
rationality is required.  
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In the present setting, rationality is defined as internal consistency within a being capable of 
thought. With no doubt that the Prisoner’s dilemma Nash-equilibrium is a rational procedure and 
that humans are driven by their own senses and thoughts to attain maximized states of equilibria; 
but a species filled with rational individuals that are confronted with enough prisoner’s dilemma-
like events will inevitably succumb to extinction, while a not so intelligent one will thrive. Ethics 
and morality came to avoid the collapse of that intelligent species. They are not the traces of a 
rudimental society, are instead the sign of a matured one; if an individual incorporates, within its 
mental processes, the fate of his species, that must be seen as a sign of progress. Rationality should, 
therefore, be deeply rooted with how Darwin defined intelligence: “how efficient a species became 
doing the things they need to survive”. 
Economics does not have to forgo its analytical tools or its efforts in attaining an impartial view of 
the science’s subject; after all, those are elementary pieces of the scientific method. But if any social 
scientist aims at pretending there is not a philosophical stance behind their scientific pursue, they 
will be, at best, just pretending. As Keynes so famously put it “Practical men who believe 
themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct 
economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some 
academic scribbler of a few years back”. Having a scientific attitude is knowing the priors that 
fundament each perspective and being honest enough to update them at the pace reality unveils. 
This brief empirical work, although supporting the hypothesis that the simple teaching of 
economics seems to be biasing students into anti-moral behavior, gives some hope in two senses: 
ethical decisions seem to be offer resilience over unconscious forces, at least with the priming used; 
and high cooperation rates point to an actual human being far from the exclusively self-interested. 
Further studies should try to understand the factors, within the types of games played here, that 
influence cooperation/defection (e.g. if lives are being played or only monetary incentives). 
Parallelly, efforts should be made to better understand the workings of the different types of 
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priming -  which priming techniques are more effective in a highly conscious decision making and 
if priming remains effective outside experimental controlled environments. Lastly, the briefly 
presented redefinition of rationality should allow a different approach within microeconomic 
theory to be explored: finding a social maximizing optimum in a given circumstance (i.e. the one 
which maximizes likelihood of survival in the long-run) and then defining individual utility 
functions that fit such optimum, as well as understanding how individual preferences have to 
change in order to attain that social equilibrium.  
This is a chance for economics to move away from its reputation as a dismal science and 
devote its efforts not only in understanding how and what drives our resourced-based subsistence 
but also what should; as well as recognize there are forces outside market scopes that have and 
continue to sustain our civilization (Polanyi, 2013: [1944]). I believe present tools, when grounded 
with philosophical substance, are capable of smoothening market and social norms into virtuous, 
materially satiated societies; doing that by understanding (1) how humans behave, (2) how present 
forces influence that behavior and (3) how to use those forces into a path of sustainable existence. 
This does require economists to have a wider and deeper conceptualization of reality, but to do 
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Questionnaire 1. Laboratory setting  
Q1 Please fill below with your information. 
*Note that all this information is anonymous and it cannot be traced back to you. So please answer 







o Male  (1)  




▼ Afghanistan (1) ... Zimbabwe (197) 
 
Q5 What is the average income of your family aggregate? 
o [0; 600[ €  (1)  
o [600; 1000[ €  (2)  
o [1000; 1500[ €  (3)  
o [1500; 2500[ €  (4)  
o [2500; 4000[ €  (5)  
o More than 4000€  (6)  
 
 27 
Q6 Professional Occupancy 
o Student  (1)  
o Employed  (2)  
o Unemployed looking for work  (3)  
o Unemployed not looking for work  (4)  
o Retired  (5)  
o Disabled  (6)  
 
Q7 What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed?  
If currently enrolled, highest degree received. 
o Below High-School  (1)  
o High-School  (2)  
o Bachelor's Degree  (3)  
o Master's Degree  (4)  




Q8 Please choose below the option closest to your main field of studies. 
o Business/Economics  (1)  
o Science Oriented degree (e.g. Mathematics, Engineering, Technology)  (2)  
o Arts Oriented degree (e.g. Architecture, History, Social Studies)  (7)  
o Psychology  (4)  
o Law  (6)  
o Other  (8)  
 
Display This Question: 
If Professional Occupancy = Student 
 
Q9 GPA (Grade average of your current study program) on a scale 0-20 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Q10 What is the highest degree or level of school one of your parents has completed?  
o Below High-School  (1)  
o High-School  (2)  
o Bachelor's Degree  (3)  
o Master's Degree  (4)  
o Doctorate Degree  (5)  
 
Q11 Having to decide where you would lie in the political spectrum, please choose one of the below: 
o Left  (1)  
o Center  (2)  
o Right  (3)  
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Q12 Do you have any religious beliefs? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
Display This Question: 
If Do you have any religious beliefs? = Yes 
Q13 Please specify which religion you feel more affinity 
o Hinduism  (1)  
o Judaism  (2)  
o Buddhism  (3)  
o Christianity  (4)  
o Islam  (5)  
o Other  (6)  
 
End of Block: Prior 
 
Start of Block: Priming - Homo Economicus 
 
Q14 Write the following sentence in the correct order.  
 
 was ago. Glass 3600 years invented 
______ was (1) 
______ ago. (2) 
______ Glass (3) 
______ 3600 (4) 
______ years (5) 






Q15 Write the following sentence in the correct order.  
    
moved Rationality forward. mankind 
______ moved (1) 
______ Rationality (2) 
______ forward. (3) 





Q16 Write the following sentence in the correct order. 
 
 A utility. no has without man objectives  
______ A (1) 
______ utility. (2) 
______ no (3) 
______ has (4) 
______ without (5) 
______ man (6) 





Q17 Write the following sentence in the correct order. 
 
 be won. to Games are 
______ be (1) 
______ won. (2) 
______ to (3) 
______ Games (4) 






Q18 Write the following sentence in the correct order.  
  
  is capable analytical only Human of species the thought.  
______ is (1) 
______ capable (2) 
______ analytical (3) 
______ only (4) 
______ Human (5) 
______ of (6) 
______ species (7) 
______ the (8) 





Q19 Write the following sentence in the correct order. 
 
 life, In strategy key. is  
______ life, (1) 
______ In (2) 
______ strategy (3) 
______ key. (4) 
______ is (5) 
 
End of Block: Priming - Homo Economicus 
 
Start of Block: Priming - Homo Moralis 
Q20 Write the following sentence in the correct order.  
 
 was ago. Glass 3600 years invented 
______ was (1) 
______ ago. (2) 
______ Glass (3) 
______ 3600 (4) 
______ years (5) 





Q21 Write the following sentence in the correct order.       
    
 Ancient Ethics stems Greece. from 
______ Ancient (1) 
______ Ethics (2) 
______ stems (3) 
______ Greece. (4) 






Write the following sentence in the correct order.  
 
  glue of the societies. Morality is  
______ glue (1) 
______ of (2) 
______ the (3) 
______ societies. (4) 
______ Morality (5) 





Q23 Write the following sentence in the correct order.   
 
 problem a of modern Lack world. of is goodwill  
______ problem (1) 
______ a (2) 
______ of (3) 
______ modern (4) 
______ Lack (5) 
______ world. (6) 
______ of (7) 
______ is (8) 






Q24 Write the following sentence in the correct order.  
  
  There is right. no in wrong doing  
______ There (1) 
______ is (2) 
______ right. (3) 
______ no (4) 
______ in (5) 
______ wrong (6) 




Q25 Write the following sentence in the correct order.   
 
  Social ties all a for almost humans. are constant 
______ Social (1) 
______ ties (2) 
______ all (3) 
______ a (4) 
______ for (5) 
______ almost (6) 
______ humans. (7) 
______ are (8) 
______ constant (9) 
 
End of Block: Priming - Homo Moralis 
 
Start of Block: Priming - Homo Inscius 
 
Q26 Write the following sentence in the correct order. 
 
watch sports? he motor frequently  Does 
______ watch (1) 
______ sports? (2) 
______ he (3) 
______ motor (4) 
______ frequently (5) 






Q27 Write the following sentence in the correct order. 
  
 is winter cloudy. days sky On the  
______ is (1) 
______ winter (2) 
______ cloudy. (3) 
______ days (4) 
______ sky (5) 
______ On (6) 
______ the (7) 
Page Break 
 
Q28 Write the following sentence in the correct order. 
  
 denser. smaller however, than Earth,  composition is  its Mercury is  
______ denser. (1) 
______ smaller (2) 
______ however, (3) 
______ than (4) 
______ Earth, (5) 
______ composition (6) 
______ is (7) 
______ its (8) 
______ Mercury (9) 





Q29 Write the following sentence in the correct order.  
  
 was ago. Glass 3600 years invented 
______ was (1) 
______ ago. (2) 
______ Glass (3) 
______ 3600 (4) 
______ years (5) 






Q30 Write the following sentence in the correct order. 
  
 a has country door. white house My 
______ a (1) 
______ has (2) 
______ country (3) 
______ door. (4) 
______ white (5) 
______ house (6) 
______ My (7) 
 
End of Block: Priming - Homo Inscius 
 





Q32 Write a four letter word as the image above hints (GO _ D).  
________________________________________________________________ 
 
End of Block: GO_D 
 










Q34 How many units of the alfa medicine do you think your colleagues in the room gave? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
End of Block: Tale of two cities 
 








Q36 How many units of the alfa medicine do you think your colleagues in the room gave? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
End of Block: Trust Game 
 




“If we all make systematic mistakes in our decisions, then why not develop new strategies, tools, and 
methods to help us make better decisions and improve our overall well-being? That's exactly the 
meaning of free lunches- the idea that there are tools, methods, and policies that can help all of us 
make better decisions and as a consequence achieve what we desire.”  
 
Professor Dan Ariely, author of Predictably Irrational 
 
End of Block: 2º Round Priming - Homo Economics 
 




“But if all maximizing models are really arguing is that “people will always seek to maximize 
something,” then they obviously can’t predict anything, which means employing them can hardly be 
said to make anthropology more scientific. All they really add to analysis is a set of assumptions 
about human nature. The assumption, most of all, that no one ever does anything primarily out of 
concern for others; that whatever one does, one is only trying to get something out of it for oneself. In 
common English, there is a word for this attitude. It’s called “cynicism.” Most of us try to avoid 
people who take it too much to heart. In economics, apparently, they call it “science.”      
 
Professor David Graeber, author of Toward An Anthropological Theory of Value 
 
End of Block: 2º Round Priming - Homo Moralis 
 
Start of Block: 2º Round Priming - Homo Inscius 
 
Q39 
"U.S. health officials on Thursday reported 1,888 confirmed and probable cases and 3 more deaths 
from a mysterious respiratory illness tied to vaping, taking the total death toll to 37. Last week, the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reported 1,604 cases and 34 deaths from the 
illness and said the number of reported cases in the epidemic appears to be leveling off or 
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declining. However, the CDC said last week it was too early to say whether the outbreak had 
peaked."  
Reuters 
End of Block: 2º Round Priming - Homo Inscius 
 
Start of Block: Probabilities Game 
Q40 
 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
End of Block: Probabilities Game 
 




   
o Give the information on the other person  (1)  
o Not give the information and remain silent  (2)  
 
End of Block: classic prisoner 
 
Start of Block: Last Questions 
 
Q42 What do you think was the purpose of this experiment? 
o To see how fast people decide and how it relates to performance  (1)  
o To evaluate people's ability to do tasks in an experimental context  (2)  
o To check if is possible to predict choices based on personal information  (3)  
o I don't know  (4)  




Q43 Have you ever attended a Game Theory course? 
o Yes  (1)  




Q44 Thank you for your collaboration!  
If you please write your email address below, we will be kind enough to share with you what this 





Questionnaire 2. Online setting  
 
Start of Block: Intro 
 
Q1 All this information is anonymous and it can not be traced back to you. So please answer 
everything as truthfully as possible for the benefit of science.  
Thank you for collaborating in the pursuit of knowledge.  
 
 
For the first exercise just drag and drop the words in the right position.  
 
End of Block: Intro 
 
Start of Block: Priming - Homo Economicus 
 
Q2 Write the following sentence in the correct order.  
 
 was ago. Glass 3600 years invented 
______ was (1) 
______ ago. (2) 
______ Glass (3) 
______ 3600 (4) 
______ years (5) 






Q3 Write the following sentence in the correct order.  
    
moved Rationality forward. mankind 
______ moved (1) 
______ Rationality (2) 
______ forward. (3) 




Q4 Write the following sentence in the correct order. 
  
 A utility. no has without man objectives  
______ A (1) 
______ utility. (2) 
______ no (3) 
______ has (4) 
______ without (5) 
______ man (6) 




Q5 Write the following sentence in the correct order. 
 
 be won. to Games are 
______ be (1) 
______ won. (2) 
______ to (3) 
______ Games (4) 





Q6 Write the following sentence in the correct order.  
  
  is capable analytical only Human of species the thought.  
______ is (1) 
______ capable (2) 
______ analytical (3) 
______ only (4) 
______ Human (5) 
______ of (6) 
______ species (7) 
______ the (8) 





Q7 Write the following sentence in the correct order. 
 
 life, In strategy key. is  
______ life, (1) 
______ In (2) 
______ strategy (3) 
______ key. (4) 
______ is (5) 
 
End of Block: Priming - Homo Economicus 
 
Start of Block: Priming - Homo Moralis 
 
Q8 Write the following sentence in the correct order.  
 
 was ago. Glass 3600 years invented 
______ was (1) 
______ ago. (2) 
______ Glass (3) 
______ 3600 (4) 
______ years (5) 
______ invented (6) 
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Q9 Write the following sentence in the correct order.       
    
 Ancient Ethics stems Greece. from 
______ Ancient (1) 
______ Ethics (2) 
______ stems (3) 
______ Greece. (4) 







Write the following sentence in the correct order.  
 
  glue of the societies. Morality is  
______ glue (1) 
______ of (2) 
______ the (3) 
______ societies. (4) 
______ Morality (5) 





Q11 Write the following sentence in the correct order.   
 
 problem a of modern Lack world. of is goodwill  
______ problem (1) 
______ a (2) 
______ of (3) 
______ modern (4) 
______ Lack (5) 
______ world. (6) 
______ of (7) 
______ is (8) 






Q12 Write the following sentence in the correct order.  
  
  There is right. no in wrong doing  
______ There (1) 
______ is (2) 
______ right. (3) 
______ no (4) 
______ in (5) 
______ wrong (6) 




Q13 Write the following sentence in the correct order.  
   
  Social ties all a for almost humans. are constant 
______ Social (1) 
______ ties (2) 
______ all (3) 
______ a (4) 
______ for (5) 
______ almost (6) 
______ humans. (7) 
______ are (8) 
______ constant (9) 
 
End of Block: Priming - Homo Moralis 
 











End of Block: GO_D 
 




o Give the information on the other person  (1)  
o Not give the information and remain silent  (2)  
 
End of Block: classic prisoner 
 
Start of Block: 2º Round Priming - Homo Economics 
 
Q18  
Please read the following quote:    
    
"A rational man is guided by its thinking - a process of Reason - not by his feelings or desires."    
    
Ayn Rand   
 
End of Block: 2º Round Priming - Homo Economics 
 
Start of Block: 2º Round Priming - Homo Moralis 
 
Q19 
Please read the following quote:    
    
"Emotions make us human. Denying them make us beasts"   
                                    
                                                                             Victoria Klein 
 
End of Block: 2º Round Priming - Homo Moralis 
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o No, I do not try to take the picture  (4)  
o Yes, I try to take the picture  (3)  
 
 
End of Block: Different prisoner's dilemma 
 
Start of Block: Prior 
 
Q21 Please fill below with your information. 
*Note that all this information is anonymous and it cannot be traced back to you. So please answer 






o Male  (1)  




▼ Afghanistan (1) ... Zimbabwe (197) 
Q29 What is the average net monthly income of your family aggregate? 
o [0; 600[ €  (1)  
o [600; 1000[ €  (2)  
o [1000; 1500[ €  (3)  
o [1500; 2500[ €  (4)  
o [2500; 4000[ €  (5)  
o More than 4000€  (6)  
 
 
Q30 Professional Occupancy 
o Student  (1)  
o Employed  (2)  
o Unemployed looking for work  (3)  
o Unemployed not looking for work  (4)  
o Retired  (5)  
o Disabled  (6)  
 
 
Q31 What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed?  
If currently enrolled, highest degree received. 
o Below High-School  (1)  
o High-School  (2)  
o Bachelor's Degree  (3)  
o Master's Degree  (4)  
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o Doctorate Degree  (5)  
 
Q32 Please choose below the option closest to your main field of studies. 
o Business/Economics  (1)  
o Science Oriented degree (e.g. Mathematics, Engineering, Technology)  (2)  
o Arts Oriented degree (e.g. Architecture, History, Social Studies)  (7)  
o Psychology  (4)  
o Law  (6)  
o Other  (8)  
 
 
Q33 Have you ever attended a Game Theory course? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
o  
Display This Question: 
If Professional Occupancy = Student 





Q35 What is the highest degree or level of school one of your parents has completed?  
o Below High-School  (1)  
o High-School  (2)  
o Bachelor's Degree  (3)  
o Master's Degree  (4)  




Q36 Having to decide where you would lie in the political spectrum, please choose one of the below: 
o Left  (1)  
o Center  (2)  
o Right  (3)  
 
Q37 Do you have any religious beliefs? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
Display This Question: 
If Do you have any religious beliefs? = Yes 
Q38 Please specify which religion you feel more affinity 
o Hinduism  (1)  
o Judaism  (2)  
o Buddhism  (3)  
o Christianity  (4)  
o Islam  (5)  
o Other  (6)  
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